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Reflections from a tarnished mirror: an application of Alvesson 
and Sköldberg’s "reflexive interpretation" to a study of 
curriculum design in higher education 
 
It is now widely understood that reflexivity constitutes a vital element of 
good qualitative research. However, reflexive accounts often draw on a 
single theoretical framework, thus privileging and legitimizing a particular 
interpretation of empirical data. This paper focuses on Alvesson and 
Sköldberg’s "reflexive interpretation," which arises from an interplay 
between the perspectives of grounded theory, hermeneutics, critical theory 
and postmodernism. The positioning of the researcher in such a multi-
paradigmatic relationship to the empirical data offers the potential for 
deeper meaning. By applying Alvesson and Sköldberg’s approach to a case 
study of curriculum design, I explore issues of teaching reflection to 
postgraduate students. Problematizing case study data at the level of 
hermeneutics provides insights into the temporality, complexity and 
symbolic meaning disclosed through the interpretive act. Whilst critical 
theory locates the findings within the political-ideological context, the 
postmodern perspective questions my power and authority as a teacher-
researcher of reflection. 
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Defined as a process of critical self-reflection, reflexivity is crucial for 
establishing authenticity in qualitative research (Guba and Lincoln 2005) and 
fundamental to the integrity of the researcher (Boler 2008). Reflexivity involves 
detachment, self-distancing and self-restraint (Elias 1987), which enable the 
researcher to recognize his/her epistemological influences. These influences have 
a bearing on all stages of a research project, from its conception to completion and 
evaluation (Grace 1998). A 'good' qualitative research study would be incomplete 
without a reflexive account of the research process. However, as Alvesson and 
Sköldberg (2009) contend, reflexive accounts often draw on a single theoretical 
2 
framework, thus legitimizing and privileging a particular interpretation of 
empirical data. Premised on an understanding that research findings are 
constructions and results of interpretation, Alvesson and Sköldberg's  (2009) 
reflexive methodology includes an analysis and evaluation of empirical data at 
four levels of interpretation. It involves: problematizing the empirical material, an 
engagement in the interpretive (hermeneutic) act, clarification of the political-
ideological context and consideration of questions of representation and authority.  
"Reflexive interpretation" aims at enriching the practice of reflexivity through the 
interplay of these multiple theoretical approaches: 
 
Reflexive interpretation is the opposite of empiricism and theoreticism (the use of 
a single, abstract framework offering a privileged understanding)… Reflexivity 
arises when the different elements of levels are played off against each other. It is 
in these relations and in the interfaces that reflexivity occurs.  (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg  2009,  272) 
 
 This paper applies "reflexive interpretation" to a small scale study of 
postgraduate curriculum design. The research was designed as a case study 
evaluating teaching and learning of reflection in an MA Education module. 
Following Alvesson and Sköldberg's (2009) framework, empirical data were 
analyzed from the perspectives of grounded theory, hermeneutics, critical theory 
and postmodernism. Grounded theory, the first level of interpretation 
recommended by the authors, utilizes an analysis of empirical data as a basis for 
developing a theory or as a stimulus for further investigations. The hermeneutic 
approach focuses on interpretation and emphasizes that all research is an act of 
interpretation, as is human perception itself. Critical theory and postmodern 
perspectives take the interpretation of research into the level of meta-theory by 
problematizing the "legitimacy of dominant interpretive patterns" (2009, 276).  
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The positioning of the researcher in the multi-paradigmatic relationship to 
the empirical data  begs the question of in/commensurability of paradigms. Guba 
and Lincoln pronounce a "cautious yes" to the commensurability of 
constructivism and interpretivist/postmodern critical theory, whilst also 
emphasizing the contradictory and mutually exclusive axioms of positivist and 
interpretivist approaches (2005, 201). Although Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) 
do not appear to explicitly express any paradigmatic preferences, their 
simultaneous movement 'within' and 'between' diverse theoretical perspectives has 
two implications. Firstly, it implies a degree of commensurability between the 
levels of interpretation recommended by the authors. In warning against 
researchers getting "stuck in a particular paradigm... captivated by their own 
language games," the authors thus advocate methodological pluralism (2009, 
308). Secondly, such pluralism implies that social reality is constructed in diverse 
ways depending on the epistemological positioning of social actors. Social 
constructionism, postmodernism and critical theory challenge taken-for-granted 
ways of understanding the world and seek alternatives to realism and 
post/positivism (Burr 2003). They acknowledge that all ways of understanding are 
rooted in history, culture and social institutions. Consequently, the notion of 
"truth" is problematic, as is the idea of language being a neutral medium for 
representing reality. Burr's argument that "no human can step outside their 
humanity" to become an objective, expert knower of "truth" (2003, 152) is crucial 
for understanding reflexivity. Bound up by our humanity, we are inextricably 
involved in social life, immersed in the complex networks of agents, institutions 
and events.  
Paradoxically, however, reflexivity requires both an acknowledgement of 
this involvement and, simultaneously, a degree of detachment, particularly in 
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relation to oneself. With its roots in Hegelian dialectical logic, which 
acknowledges "contradiction as 'necessity''' (Marcuse 2002, 146), the notion of  
paradox illuminates two contradictory processes inherent in reflexivity, 
involvement and detachment. Although the self is always involved, immersed in 
its own humanity, crucial to developing individual self-awareness is also 
detachment, 'stepping outside' to examine oneself (Elias 1987). As Elias (1987) 
points out, the evolution of human consciousness has been predicated on 
developing higher levels of detachment, leading to an increasing awareness of the 
'I' involved in the social world. However, some interpretations of reflection and 
reflexivity appear to perpetuate what Elias refers to as the "I without we" (1987, 
lxi), the sense of self existing in isolation or separation from others. The following 
study of postgraduate curriculum design suggests that models of reflective 
practice may accentuate the "I without we". 
 
Case study of curriculum design 
The aim of the MA Education curriculum project was to deepen students' 
understanding of reflection with a view to improving their professional practice. 
The student group comprised qualified teachers working in schools across 
London. In order to enhance student learning, I was guided by the principle of 
'constructive alignment' of module outcomes, syllabus, learning activities, 
assessment criteria and assessment tasks (Biggs 1996). Seeing constructive 
alignment as recommended good practice in Higher Education (Cowan, George, 
and Pinheiro-Torres 2004), I planned a number of activities and tasks focusing on 
reflection. They included: an evaluation and application of reflective learning 
models (Kolb 1984; Pedler, Burgoyne, and Boydell 2003; Schön, 1983, 1987), 
critical incident technique (Moon 2004) and discussion of Dewey's (1910) 
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explication of reflective thought. An assessment task of writing a reflective 
portfolio seemed to be well aligned to these activities and to the core module 
outcome, i.e. the ability of students to demonstrate a 'critical' engagement in 
reflection. Reflection, crucial in teacher training (TDA 2007), has been a focus of 
University-wide policies post-Dearing (1997). At Masters level, engagement in 
reflection would need to address the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA 2008) 
criteria for Level 7. Of relevance to Masters students would be critical awareness, 
self-direction and recognition of complexity, which would enable them to make 
decisions in "complex and unpredictable situations" (QAA 2008, 20-21).  
The research was a case study (Stake 1995) of an MA module which 
examined whether constructive alignment (Biggs 1996) enhanced students' 
learning of 'critical' reflection. Case study data comprised: students' module 
evaluations, assessment results and students' reflective portfolios. The findings 
presented in this paper are supported by extracts from students' portfolios selected 
to illustrate the often ambiguous or problematic nature of the empirical material. 
The module evaluations and assessment results suggested that students' learning 
of reflection had been enhanced. However, problematising the case study data at 
four levels of interpretation recommended by Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) 
begs further questions. The first one concerns the value of reflection as a 
curriculum outcome. The notions of  teaching and learning reflection and 
constructive alignment also merit further consideration. Lastly, my own 
positioning as a teacher-researcher needs to be reflexively evaluated. These 
questions are explored at four levels of interpretation to which this paper will now 
turn. 
 
The level of grounded theory: an analysis of empirical material 
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For Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) grounded theory is an important empirically-
oriented research approach. The focus of grounded theory on the minutiae of 
micro-worlds of everyday practice enhances its practical utility and enables the 
development of complex, subtle, finely nuanced understandings. It also raises the 
status of an 'ordinary' social researcher who, by theorizing practice, confirms that 
anyone can create theory, not just the "great men" such as "Marx, Weber, 
Durkheim, Mead, etc." (Glaser and Strauss 1967 as quoted in Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2009, 57). However, the authors argue that data oriented methods risk 
creating "trivial knowledge" if the researcher disregards the ambiguities of 
language and the influence of the political-ideological context of scientific 
enquiry. 
 I recognize the above risk as a problem with my initial case study design, 
which narrowly focused on learning conceptualized as a logical, step-by-step 
process of application of 'new' knowledge. Through a systematic engagement with 
the case study data, I sought to understand how students progress in their learning 
of reflection and how I could further support their learning. An analysis of 
students' reflective portfolios resulted in the following 'progress chart' (Figure 1): 
 
 
Figure 1 inserted here (above) 
 
The chart became my 'diagnostic tool' for identifying the 'next steps' in students' 
learning in the context of formative and summative feedback and evaluation. In 
hindsight, the chart's simplicity and utility value anchored my teaching practice in 
a reductive framework of logical incrementalism. Within this framework, the 
reflective portfolios appeared to demonstrate, as 'evidence' of learning, both 
students’ own reflection and references to theoretical frameworks for reflection 
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discussed in module sessions. The following extract by 'Anna' (a pseudonym), a 
secondary Mathematics teacher, pointing to the benefits of reflection, merits 
attention as ‘evidence of learning’: 
 
I realize that reflection prevents me from cultivating an over-positive and 
dogmatic habit of mind (Pollard 2002). "To be genuinely thoughtful, we must be 
willing to sustain and protract that state of doubt which is the stimulus to 
thorough inquiry" (Pollard 2002, 4). Reflective teachers can benefit from 




 However, as Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) point out, qualitative 
empirical data are ambiguous. The above extract can be interpreted in a number of 
ways: as a record of making sense of experience, as ‘evidence of learning’ which 
contributes to a grade, or a measure of a relative 'success' of my curriculum 
design. These readings could also be challenged: is Anna's writing an expression 
of a genuine voice or an attempt to meet assignment marking criteria? What are 
the consequences of assigning a percentage grade to a tutor’s pre-conceived 
notion of students’ understanding of reflection? In assuming the role of a more 
knowledgeable other (Vygotsky 1978),  does the tutor enhance student learning, 
or does she endorse the "axiom of inequality" which underpins education and 
other social systems (Rancière 2010, 6)? 
 Anna's extract suggests that her reflective portfolio task enhanced attitudes 
which, according to Dewey (1916), can be cultivated through reflection.  
However, a comparison of the extract with the published source raises questions 
regarding the authenticity of Anna's writing: 
 
 One can think reflectively only when one is willing to endure suspense and 
 to undergo the trouble of searching. To many persons both suspense and 
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 judgement and intellectual search are disagreeable; they want to get them 
 ended as soon as possible. They cultivate an over-positive and dogmatic 
 habit of mind, or feel perhaps that a condition of doubt will be regarded as 
 evidence of mental inferiority... To be genuinely thoughtful, we must be 
 willing to sustain and protract that state of doubt which is the stimulus to 
 thorough inquiry.  (Dewey 1910 as quoted in Pollard 2002, 4) 
 
 Is Anna's reflection a genuine expression of profound changes in thinking, 
or simply a paraphrase of the original text intended to impress the examiner and 
thus an example of "pseudo-reflection" (Moore 2004, 109)? And, even if the latter 
is the case, to what extent does it matter? If we agree with the premise that "a 
meaning of a word is its use" (Wittgenstein 1953, 43), then by using language we 
create meanings "while language works on us" (Bleakley 2000, 19). Therefore, 
the act of writing down a paraphrase of the original text may have led Anna to a 
genuine understanding. 
 Another issue which merits attention at the level of empirical data is to 
what extent my position as a teacher-researcher affected the case study findings. 
In order to examine the relationship between the constructive alignment of 
module curriculum and students' learning of 'critical' reflection, I developed 
research instruments which focused in particular on the perceived cause 
(constructive alignment) and effect (enhanced learning of reflection). However, 
both the notion of constructive alignment and the single cause - single effect 
research can be contested. The former has been criticized for creating rigid, 
teacher-centered curricular ‘packages’ which exclude creativity, impede emergent 
learning and stifle the development of student agency (Hussey and Smith 2003; 
Knight 2001). The predictability of learning outcomes contradicts the QAA 
(2008) expectation that holders of a Masters qualification are able to make 
decisions in complex, unpredictable situations. The single cause - single effect 
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thinking reduces the plethora of factors which can enhance learning to one 
variable. Thinking back about my engagement in the project, I recognize that in 
those early days of teaching in higher education, I saw my students' 'success' as 
'evidence' of my teaching competence. From the grounded theory perspective, 
further research could have addressed the issue of trustworthiness of the case 
study, however, a hermeneutic interpretation of the curriculum design project 
leads to a different set of questions, which are discussed below. 
 
The level of hermeneutics: trapped in the hall of mirrors 
At the level of hermeneutics, "the meaning of symbols becomes central" 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 318). Rooted in phenomenology, hermeneutics 
seeks to understand our everyday experience, a process which does not depend 
solely on reason, but is predicated on intuition, empathy and insight. Key to 
hermeneutical understanding is the acknowledgement that "we always belong to 
the world" and our perception and interpretations are historically conditioned 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 121). Consequently, this perspective rejects the 
notion of an objective, expert researcher-scientist, disconnected from the objects 
of his investigations. In seeking meaning, hermeneutic researchers explore the 
historical roots of our current understandings of the world, paying particular 
attention to the metaphorical and narrative aspects of language. Narrative sense-
making relies on putting experience into words, in the presence of the other. 
Hermeneutic understanding emerges from conversations with others, unlike the 
knowledge generated by the solitary subject implicit in the metaphor of reflection. 
 As one of the most powerful metaphors in the Western society (Edwards 
and Nicoll 2006), reflection has many interpretations. It implies a realist view of 
the world which privileges a visual appreciation of reality. It is a manifestation of  
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"a cultural obsession with the mirror" and narcissistic tendencies (Bleakley 1999, 
320). Mirrors can also distort reality and result in "warped and twisted forms of 
reflection" (Foucault 1970, 343), as reflection turns to self-surveillance. 
Consequently, the mirror metaphor signifies both reality and illusion, freedom to 
realize the self and self-imposed imprisonment. The discourse of reflection may 
be interpreted as a language game which positions reflection as intrinsically 
worthwhile and thus essential for leading a worthwhile life (Bleakley 1999; 
Edwards and Nicoll 2006). Our socialization into the language game of the 
reflective human being entices us to accept such understanding of reflection as the 
norm; by conforming to the norm we re-construct and perpetuate this way of 
making sense of the world.   
 The enduring effect of the reflection metaphor could therefore be 
interpreted as legitimizing certain ontological and epistemological approaches. 
Ontologically, the mirror metaphor constructs dualistic distinctions between the 
observer and external reality, between the realms of objects and ideas, between 
seeing and other senses. An epistemological critique of the metaphor of the mind 
as a great mirror reflecting nature is presented by Rorty, who posits that, since the 
Enlightenment, knowledge has been conceptualized as "accurate representation" 
(1979, 12).  In challenging the "ocular metaphors" which dominate Western 
thinking, Rorty points out that they are simply a historical phenomenon, a social 
construct:  
  
 The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a 
 great mirror, containing various representations... Without the notion of the mind 
 as mirror, the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation would not have 
 suggested itself. Without this latter notion, the strategy common to Descartes and 
 Kant - getting more accurate representations by inspecting, repairing, and 
 polishing the mirror, so to speak - would not have made sense.  (Rorty 1979, 12)  
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 Implicit in the 'grand' metaphor of reflective practice is a passive self 
reflecting an objective reality. However, as Giddens argues, "the self is not a 
passive entity, determined by external influences; in forging their self-identities… 
individuals contribute to and directly promote social influences" (1991, 2). The 
view of human agency as both constituted and constitutive is developed further by 
Elias (1991), who posits that the humankind, rather than the single individual, 
needs to be a frame of reference for epistemological considerations. This is 
because humans are not independent, but interdependent, oriented towards and 
linked with each other in diverse ways (Elias 1978). Interdependence contradicts 
the notion of a priori knowledge, the I-centered mental activity which asserts the 
autonomous, knowing subject objectifying what is to be known:  
  
 The traditional human image associated with thought, and thus also with mind, is 
 that of an isolated human individual... I am no longer following that tradition. 
 Communication in the form of human speech...  presupposes as the normal form 
 of living a life in groups. So does the activity we call thinking.  (Elias 1991, 81) 
 
 Knowledge can be acquired in two interconnected ways: through personal 
experience (a posteriori) and via communication with others. The symbols of 
language learned by individuals introduce them to what Elias refers to as the 
"social fund of knowledge" (1991, 113). 'Samantha', a work-placement co-
ordinator in her secondary school, seems to be on the threshold of such 
understanding in her critique of the 'misuse' of reflective practice: 
  
 I believe that there is a tendency to misuse reflective practice and find that 
 there is a need for... bringing reflexive practice to the fore, allowing for the 
 development of socially aware teachers who listen to voices other than their 
 own.  (from Samantha's writing) 
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 Samantha appears to be on the threshold of a new horizon of 
understanding, premised on the view of the individual as interdependent, unlike 
the "I without we" promoted by mainstream interpretations of reflective practice. 
The notion of interdependence of human agents entails that reflection on an action 
has meaning only when it accounts for what it means both for the reflecting 
individual and for others: "the meaning of an action for the actor is codetermined 
by the meaning it may have for others" (Elias 1991,  49). Within a wider 
epistemological frame, it also points to the importance of the dynamic, dialectic 
processes of knowledge construction, in which articulation in the social context is 
central. Creating new understandings... 
 
 cannot be performed single-handedly by one individual. It is a task which can 
 only be performed by the co-operation of many  individuals through a sequence of 
 generations.  (Elias 1991, 143) 
 
 The questions which arise at this level of interpretation concern my role as 
a teacher of reflection. What were the consequences of setting the students the 
reflective portfolio task? Have I been instrumental in trapping the students in the 
hall of mirrors - in ‘coercing’ them into a socially accepted meaning of reflection 
and thus in promoting a certain ontological and epistemological positioning? Or 
have I facilitated understanding, which, according to Elias (1991), Rorty (1979) 
and phenomenological writers, is a matter of engagement in dialogue? 
 Hermeneutic understanding is predicated on the "fusion of horizons" 
(Gadamer 2004). The concept of horizon situates understanding within our 
individual, historically limited field of meaning. "Fusion of horizons" denotes 
continuous mediation of meaning and new understandings which emerge as a 
result of conversations with others. The movement back and forth between ours 
and others' horizons "leads to the gradual revising and/or enriching of our own" 
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(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 120). At this level of interpretation, we are 
reminded that, "to be human is to be concerned with meaning, to desire meaning" 
and this "desire to make sense… is not just a psychological state; it is a state of 
being" (Van Manen 1990, 79). At this level, therefore, the pedagogical situation 
researched through my case study presents itself as a narrative account of lived 
experience of the students and the teacher-researcher engaged in making sense of 
the complex lifeworld in which reflection is one of the central themes.  
 
'Smoke and mirrors': a critical theory perspective 
Critical theory's focus on the political dimensions in research highlights social 
actors' responsibility for emancipatory social change. Alvesson and Sköldberg 
(2009) refer to this perspective as a meta-theory, because it seeks a critical 
interpretation of the dominant forms of understanding. The authors argue that its 
emancipatory impulse arises from explorations of the deep structures of 
unquestioned values and beliefs which, at the level of surface structures, "give rise 
to frozen social institutions and locked thought and action" (2009, 168). Driven by 
the principle of thinking in a dialectic way, critical theory negates the existing 
social order, allowing for alternatives to be imagined. At this level of 
interpretation, the focus is on the ways in which dominant ideologies may be 
uncritically taken for granted and reproduced both through teaching and research 
practices. 
 A critical theory view exposes the hidden curriculum, driven by the 
dominant political ideology and surfacing as the 'newspeak' of standardization and 
outcomes (Kelly 2004). The ideal of reflective practice popularized by Schön 
(1987), has been subsequently trivialized by such documents as the Dearing 
Report 1997 or the Personal, Learning and Thinking Skills (PLTS) curriculum for 
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secondary pupils (QCA 2007). These policies standardize reflection as a crucial 
skill for the members of the "learning society" (Dearing 1997), "needed for 
success in learning and life" (QCA 2007). Both documents present reflection as 
unproblematic and shallow, as a means to an end. For example, Chapter 8 of the 
Dearing Report, Students and Learning, which is 5,000 words in length, has only 
two references to reflection. In one of its 88 Recommendations, the Report briefly 
refers to reflection in the context of Personal Development Planning (PDP). PDP 
is described as:  
 
 a structured and supported process undertaken by an individual to reflect 
 upon their own learning and/or achievement and to plan for their personal 
 education and career development.  (Recommendation 20, Dearing 1997) 
  
 Reflection is presented here as a straightforward activity of evaluating 
prior learning or achievement with a view to future development. Whilst Dearing 
(1997) promotes reflection without engaging in its definitions or in relation to 
broader aims of education, the PLTS curriculum (QCA 2007) explicitly frames 
the outcomes of reflective learning as a range of "skills, behaviours and personal 
qualities."  Reflective learners are described as... 
  
 Young people [who] evaluate their strengths and limitations, setting  themselves 
 realistic goals with criteria for success. They monitor their own performance and 
 progress, inviting feedback from others and making changes to further their 
 learning.  (QCA 2007)  
 
 The themes of success, performance and progress which frame this 
description resonate with Dearing's (1997) model of reflective learning. Reflective 
learners are future oriented, 'busy' young people. Engaging in reflection is a 
simple, agreeable process, as Dewey's (1910) doubt and "trouble of searching" are 
being replaced with dealing "positively with praise, setbacks and criticism" (QCA 
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2007). The actions of assessing, goal setting and monitoring performance take 
reflective learners step-by-step through the learning cycle, steering them away 
from unrealistic goals, which might make them 'unsuccessful'. What is ignored in 
this model is reflection as a meaning-making process. Reflection has been reduced 
to a skill which can be performed and linked to observable outcomes, such as 
'success'. The discourse of reflection becomes a disciplinary mechanism (Foucault 
1977), producing an educated person who, in accordance with the current political 
doctrine, is employable, successful, ready for life and work in the "learning 
society". However, a subject prepared for living in a capitalist, neoliberal society 
is "malleable rather than committed, flexible rather than principled – essentially 
depthless" (Ball 2012, 31).  He is in possession of 'expert' skills. In the modern 
capitalist society, which has evolved from democracy to "expertocracy," experts 
hold the power over what is legitimate and possible (Bauman 2005). In Bauman's 
analysis, experts build their authority on the basis of "assured" meanings, as they 
are "almost by definition people who "get the facts straight", who take the facts as 
they come and think of the least risky way of living in their company" (2005, 
1094-95). Expert solutions, however, come at a cost to democratic relations, by 
creating the divide between experts and non-experts. In a truly democratic society, 
argues Bauman, all individuals have freedom to create meanings for their lives 
and are able to participate in deciding whether they want "a life under the 
conditions that are being presented to [them]" (2005, 1094).  
 As a secondary teacher, Samantha is accountable for teaching the PLTS 
curriculum to her pupils and, simultaneously, obliged to participate in the 
disciplinary rituals of 'forced reflection'. She argues that... 
 
 What should be explored is the value of the reflection undertaken as an integral 
 part of a teaching career. There is a dichotomy between truly reflective processes 
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 and those which masquerade as true reflection, but are in effect bureaucratic 
 recording processes. Recorded reflection satisfies school recording processes and 
 feeds into the school improvement machine; supposedly evidencing improvement 
 in practice on an individual level. Lesson plan templates often include a small 
 box for forced reflection...   (from Samantha's writing) 
 
 
 Negating the processes which 'masquerade as true reflection' creates 
opportunities for imagining alternatives, such as 'educative' or 'critical' reflection. 
For Samantha, an alternative is afforded by reflexivity. For Dewey the "educative 
value" of reflection is rooted in deliberate attempts to unearth taken for granted 
assumptions, when...  
 
 ...the ground or basis for a belief is deliberately sought and its adequacy to 
 support the belief is examined. This process is called reflective thought; it 
 alone is truly educative in value.  (Dewey 1910, 2) 
 
 For Barnett, the emancipatory purpose of higher education is underpinned 
by critical reflection which needs to "take on knowledge itself" in order to create 
"imaginary alternatives" and lead to constructive action (1997, 5-7). In the light of 
these arguments, the focus of teaching reflection shifts from promoting the 
dominant normative values to encouraging agency and responsibility to act, rather 
than being acted upon. As Harré and Gillett emphasize, such action starts with an 
examination of one's meaning and value systems: 
 
It is my evaluations of my own activity that are the ultimate effective source of 
semantic conformity. As semantics (or meanings) are the core of intentionality… 
I am therefore a participant in and not merely an object of social causation.  
(Harré and Gillett 1994, 118) 
 
 Harré and Gillett argue that "freedom is a discursive activity," something 
that we do, rather than have (1994, 113). At the level of critical theory, teaching 
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(and researching) with integrity is a political action, which aims at raising the 
consciousness of social actors, seeks to open spaces for "doing freedom" and 
allows discussions of possible ideological bias (Grace 1998). By becoming 
reflexive, reflective portfolios could engage students in questioning their own 
assumptions and opinions, interrogating the origins of their beliefs and 
scrutinizing their ontological and epistemological foundations.   
 
Shattered mirror and postmodern kaleidoscopic patterns of reflection 
By breaking away from the modern tendency to build knowledge on the firm 
foundations of 'grand narratives', postmodernism simultaneously shatters the 
conception of the mind as the mirror of nature (Rorty 1979). As Alvesson and 
Sköldberg explain, postmodernism dispels the myth of universal laws, "rational, 
global solutions and explanations" and replaces it with "microhistories - local, 
always provisory and limited stories" (2009, 180). Postmodern life fragments our 
day-to-day existence and our being. It also shatters the idea of researcher identity 
as singular, stable and fixed (Thomson and Gunter 2011). Each fragment of 
experience is then reflected in the multiple mirrors of diverse theoretical and 
ideological perspectives. Constantly shifting kaleidoscopic patterns, made up of 
tensions, ironies and paradoxes, emerge as a result. As Alvesson and Sköldberg 
point out, an interpretation of research at this level will be permeated with irony.   
 Perhaps the most relevant irony would be Schön’s (1987) notion of 
reflection itself. His concept of the reflective practitioner was an alternative to 
models of professionalism based on technical rationality: 
 
Technical rationality is an epistemology of practice derived from positivist 
philosophy built into the very foundations of the modern research university… 
18 
Technical rationality holds that practitioners are instrumental problem solvers 
who select technical means best suited to particular purposes.  (Schön 1987,  3) 
  
 Used in the "indeterminate zones of practice – uncertainty, uniqueness, and 
value conflict" (Schön 1987: 6), reflection complements other non-technical 
rational professional qualities: "outstanding practitioners are not said to have more 
professional knowledge than others but more 'wisdom,' 'talent,' 'intuition,' or 
'artistry''' (13). However, as Bleakley (1999) points out, Schön’s failure to develop 
his model of reflective practice as artistry and his examples which present 
reflection as a technique, may lead to interpretations of Schön’s reflection from a 
technical-rational perspective. This can be illustrated by the following account of 
a critical incident narrated by 'Mark', a secondary Geography teacher: 
 
On reflection, I had made the right choice when I decided to stop the argument 
with the Inspector and report it to my Head of Department. This decision is 
supported by Schön’s (1983) model of ‘framing’ and ‘re-framing’ the situation. 
When the argument started, I framed the situation by identifying the problem, its 
parameters and factors relevant in the situation. As the problem persisted and the 
Inspector would not accept my explanation, I decided to change the ‘parameters’ 
and ‘re-frame’ the problem - I went to seek advice from my Head of Department.  
(from Mark's reflective portfolio) 
 
 Mark's analysis of a critical incident is underpinned by Schön’s (1983) 
steps in the process of reframing. This extract can be read as an example of a 
student drawing on a theoretical framework to explain practice, a welcome 
Masters level outcome (QAA 2008). However, it also reads like a technical 
'matching exercise', in which the unfolding critical incident is fitted into the stages 
of framing and reframing. Lost in this technical-rational process are not only the 
underlying emotions, but also reflection as "the trouble of searching"  (Dewey 
1910, 22), rather than an affirmation of the 'right choice'. Mark's reframing could, 
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therefore, be interpreted as engagement in reflection which is essentially 
unreflective, promoting "reaffirmation of belief rather than a tool for exploration 
and for thinking otherwise" (Ball 1995 as quoted in Ecclestone 1996, 152). A 
more detailed narrative account of the communication between Mark and the 
Inspector could have allowed him to explore the Inspector's perspective. 
Ironically, however, academic writing conventions recommend developing critical 
analysis and keeping narrative description to a minimum (Moon 2004; Wallace 
and Wray 2006). In the light of the postmodern claim that "all writing is narrative 
writing," an alternative approach, respecting Mark's and other students' voices, 
would acknowledge them as "situated speakers, subjectivities engaged in 
knowing/telling the world as they perceive it" (Richardson and St. Pierre 2005, 
961).  
 Models of reflective practice can thus be interpreted as locking 
practitioners into one particular type of subjectivity, which privileges rationality 
over other psychic functions, such as intuition or recognition of the unconscious. 
As Jung (1964) points out, excessive rationalism stunts the development of the 
Western psyche. An alternative mirror metaphor, which would allow for a more 
balanced development, is that of a "tarnished mirror" (Hawthorne 1992, 52-54), 
seen in moonlight, "one remove further from the actual."  Looking in the 
"tarnished mirror" liberates the observer from the ‘objective’ reality seen in broad 
daylight and takes her to the world of imagination and the unconscious. In Jungian 
(1964) terms, facing the "darkness inside" enables an integration of the shadow, 
which is a prerequisite for self-transcendence. With his tarnished mirror metaphor, 
Hawthorne, a 19th century fiction writer, embraces a 20th century insight that:  
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We can no longer deny that the dark stirrings of the unconscious are active 
powers, that psychic forces exist which, for the present at least, cannot be fitted 
into our rational world order.  (Jung 1971, 463) 
 
 From the psychoanalytic perspective, Britzman (1998) argues for an 
education which would recognize the unconscious, "haunted," "bothered" aspects 
of self. This is because, having replaced doubt and ambivalence with a relentless 
focus on standardization, performativity and culture of success, the technical-
rational education can be destructive for the self: 
 
devastating experiences within the self occur when education bonds with 
idealization, denies its own difficulties and the difficulties of others, and involves 
the absolute splitting of good and bad and of failure and success in terms that 
disregard human complexity.  (Britzman 2003, 7)  
 
 As Elliott and Lemert (2006) point out, being "wrecked by success" is a 
commonplace paradox of our times.  
 In place of reflection, Britzman advocates reflexivity, whereby the teacher 
seeks an understanding of his own development "as it plays through, repeats, and 
becomes elaborated within the teacher’s relations with individual children, school 
knowledge, other adults, and, of course, the teacher’s own self" (1998, 9). Such 
reflexivity is also essential for the postmodern researcher, who acknowledges that, 
ironically, educational research is "unavoidably, a rhetorical affair, or 
'fabrication''' (MacLure 2003, 80).  Just like reflection, however, reflexivity may 
also be reduced to "techniques for telling the reflexive self" (Skeggs 2002). 
Skeggs criticizes approaches in which reflexivity is constructed as a... 
 
 normative requirement of rigorous methodology, when really it is merely a 
 mechanism by which the romantic aesthetics of the whole and coherent self are 
 put into place in the name of intellectual practice.  (Skeggs 2002, 352)  
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 Techniques for telling the reflexive self often build the authority of the 
researcher by de-authorizing the articulations of research participants. Reporting 
the movement of the researcher’s reflexive self can simultaneously fix others. 
Skeggs concludes that there is a difference between claims to reflexivity as a 
technique for authorizing oneself and doing reflexivity in practice. Assuming a 
position of a detached spectator, a position of power over research participants, 
may easily lead to objectifying others as "resources for self-formation" (369). 
Reflexivity as practice, however, is about researchers repeatedly asking: "Can we 
hear?"  Reflexivity in action is about... 
 
...a movement from telling and confession to practice and positioning. This is a 
call for accountability and responsibility in research, not for self-formation and 
self-promotion.  (Skeggs 2002, 369) 
 
 
 The tension in accounts of reflexivity as practice is, however, inevitable, 
because of the detachment inherent in the process of accounting. The very process 
of telling is a movement away from being involved, immersed in practice to 
narrating action. It is a process of detaching (Elias 1987). As I narrate my 
experience of being reflexive in action, in my research practice, I use the signs of 
language and, to make my personal meanings available to the reader, I refer to 
reflexivity objectified as definitions, conceptualizations, accounts and insights by 
other researchers. Such "intellectualization of method" (Alvesson and Sköldberg  
2009, 1) draws me further into abstraction, away from being immersed in 
reflexivity as practice. 
Paradoxically, however, such detachment from the self is also crucial for 
being reflexive. I recall moments of being there for my students-research 
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participants, being attentive to, and respectful of the learning journeys narrated in 
class and their reflective portfolios and simultaneously being aware of who I am 
in terms of my "position," "investment," "habitus," "history," and "politics" 
(Skeggs 2002, 368). In these moments I experienced being reflexive; a teacher-
researcher in an interdependent relationship with students, where the 'I' cannot 
exist without the 'we' and power is mutual. 
 
Conclusion: constructing possible alternative futures 
This paper has sought to highlight the importance of reflexivity in teaching and 
qualitative research. Engaging with empirical material at four levels of 
interpretation illuminates the problematic nature of both. Whilst the above 
discussions problematize the post/modern practices of reflection and reflexivity 
and trace their historical roots, my concluding thoughts turn to possible futures by 
asking: 'What would happen, if...?'  To overcome the tendency to look back, 
inherent in reflexivity, a reflexive researcher-teacher needs to also engage in 
considerations which attempt "to bridge where we are and where we might end 
up" (Cherryholmes 1999, 3). Where we might end up, if unreflective/unreflexive 
modes of teaching and learning continue to be practiced, is a "learning society" 
whose citizens have been educated to submission rather than freedom. Biggs's 
(1996, 2003) framework for constructive alignment may be a helpful technique for 
designing the curriculum, as a technical starting point rather than a prescription for 
the complete process. The metaphors chosen by Biggs imply the latter: 
 
 The key is that the components in the teaching system, especially the teaching 
 methods used and the assessment tasks, are aligned with the learning activities 
 assumed in the intended outcomes. The learner is in a sense 'trapped', and finds it 




 The use of passive voice in relation to the learner, who "is intended to 
learn" a set of outcomes, introduces external, enforced intentionality which denies 
students their agency. Outcomes-based education is equivalent to conceiving the 
"development of mind as an outcome", argues Barnett; it is a "hopelessly limited 
way of construing higher education" (1994, 81). Interpreting Biggs's framework 
from multiple theoretical perspectives begs further questions about the "intended 
outcomes": Whose intentionality do they promote? Whose interests are these 
intentions meant to serve? On whose authority? And what would happen if the 
'reflective student' discarded the step-by-step recipes for success endorsed by the 
learning society? What if the 'reflective practitioner' resisted the prevailing 
political perspectives and reductionist approaches to knowledge they promote? 
What would emerge from a recognition that the nature of knowledge, language 
and thought presupposes social, rather than individual processes of learning, 
working and living (Elias 1991)?   
 As Harré and Gillett (1994) point out, constructing possible alternative 
futures starts as a discursive action. This argument calls for a recognition that 
what is communicated to students in the process of education may construct 
particular versions of the world for them to know and accept. Consequently, the 
main task of education would be to create opportunities for students to explore 
diverse perspectives, discourses and universes of meaning:   
 
One needs to live, to visit, to know intimately more than one such universe to spy 
out human invention behind any universe’s imposing and apparently indomitable 
structure...   (Bauman 2005, 1092) 
 
 The "indomitable structure" of privileged, expert meanings becoming the 
dominant reality needs to be critically examined and contested, if the current 
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advance of "expertocracy" is to be arrested. Alvesson and Sköldberg's (2009) 
invitation to visit the universes of grounded theory, hermeneutics, critical theory 
and postmodernism can be, therefore, viewed as open to all: the educator, 
researcher and student. It is an invitation to engage in a reflexive practice which 
seeks to "intimately know" these universes, to become involved but not "trapped" 
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